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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
CROSS-PETITIONER 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT 
Case No. 20040365-SC 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I 
A COMPENSABLE "TAKING" HAS OCCURRED BY REASON 
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEDICATION AND 
INSTALLED IMPROVEMENTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
STANDARDS OF THE NOLLAN-DOLAN FRAMEWORK, 
REGARDLESS OF THE CLAIMED "LEGISLATIVE" FOUNDATION 
OF THE COUNTY'S REQUIREMENT CONSTITUTING THE "TAKING" 
The COUNTY opens its REPLY BRIEF with the rather 
cavalier statement that this case is so unique, so 
sophisticated and so precise that it presents a 
question of "first impression" and that there are no 
other cases nationally on this issue. The COUNTY is 
simply incorrect in that assessment of the 
jurisprudential landscape. 
In reality, there are at least three "cases" which 
have direct bearing and application to the "takings" 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., 
a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Cross-Petitioner 
vs 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
body politic and political 
subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Cross-Petitioner 
1 
claims raised in this "inverse condemnation" 
litigation. The first and second of these cases are 
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission 483 US 825, 97 
LEd2d 677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan"], 
and Dolan vs City of Tigard (1994), 512 US 374, 129 
Led2d 304, 114 Set 2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"]. 
Those decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
identify and apply "constitutional principles" which 
although the COUNTY does not want to follow those 
principles have direct and dispositive application to 
the situation-at-hand. Nollan and Dolan essentially 
"speak for themselves": their applicability to the 
instant situation is more than obvious the 
identification of any interpretative decisions of lower 
courts is not only unnecessary, but according to the 
COUNTY such additional cases do not exist. [The 
assertion i.e. that there are no other cases is 
strongly disputed by B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT. The cases are 
numerous, almost numberless. But we needn't "go there" 
because of the relative simplicity of the 
constitutional principle (i.e "just compensation" for 
"property taken" for "public use") involved.] 
The "third" appellate court decision of relevance 
is the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
case: namely, B.A.M. Development/ L.L.C. vs Salt Lake 
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County, 2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004) 
[hereinafter "the Decision"] . Therein, each of the 
three judges of the Court of Appeals recognized the 
obvious applicability of the Nollan-Dolan framework to 
the situation-at-hand. Judge ORME albeit in dissent, 
but only because of the Court of Appeals "wanderings" 
(undersigned's terminology) into uncharted territory 
from the unappealed, unbriefed "administrative remand" 
issue now conceded by the COUNTY to have been 
inappropriately decided wrote a scholarly and 
masterful decision on the "just compensation" aspects 
of the case. The Supreme Court would be prudent to 
follow the jurisprudential precedent set by Judge ORME 
of the Court of Appeals. He "nailed it". 
The "constitutional essence" of this case is 
literally "boiled down" to the COUNTY'S written 
observations, although the COUNTY'S conclusions totally 
miss the mark, as contained in pages 5-6 of the 
COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF, thus: 
The highway-dedication ordinance at issue 
here, involves a generally applicable 
legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not 
one which is imposed or which can be 
imposed individually. As with any developer 
who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a 
highway, BAM was required here to comply with 
a uniform legislative scheme which expects all 
similarly situated developers [footnote 
omitted] to dedicate highway rights-of-way 
consistent with current uniform road-width 
standards. Such a uniform scheme is 
3 
fundamental to ensuring that community 
development occurs in accordance with sensible 
long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, 
under BAM's view of the law, road-width 
requirements for new construction along major 
traffic corridors would vary radically from 
parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, 
usage, and other impact characteristics of 
each individual parcel. In practical effect, 
an "individualized" impact analysis would 
require a different road-width dedication for 
every single parcel located along the side of 
a highway. Rather than having roadways with 
even and consistent widths, road boundaries 
would be required to jut in and out in front 
of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an 
"individualized determination" of each 
parcel's traffic impact. The absurd practical 
consequences of this application of Dolan 
"rough proportionality" in such a case are 
obvious. 
Pages 5-6 of COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF. Italicized text in 
original. Citation to footnote omitted. 
The "picture" the COUNTY thus "paints" has the 
following obvious features, which the COUNTY seemingly 
ignores: 
1. ONLY "highway-abutting" parcels are 
singled out for the roadway dedication 
requirement. The development of other 
similarly-situated parcels "similarly-
situated" approached not in terms of "highway-
abutting" but rather generally in terms of 
creating the same impact (i.e. vehicular 
traffic added to the roadway infrastructure) --
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require. 
What the COUNTY in its self-serving "constitutional 
myopia" is refusing to recognize, but which the COURT 
will readily acknowledge, is that there is another 
potential result, namely, that the Government can have 
roadways of whatever width it chooses, but the 
Government must pay "just compensation" for the 
property interests it "takes" 
Understood in its essential substance and 
procedure, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance has in 
fact and in law as its transparent purpose, "the 
avoidance of the Just Compensation requirement". The 
Ordinance, rather than being legitimized, is thus 
condemned, as the United States Supreme Court in Nollan 
wrote: 
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the 
condition and the original purpose of the 
building restriction converts that purpose to 
something other than what it was. The purpose 
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of 
an easement to serve some valid governmental 
purpose, but without payment of compensation. 
Whatever may be the outer limits of 
"legitimate state interests" in the takings 
and land-use context, this is not one of them. 
In short, unless the permit condition serves 
the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban, the building restriction is 
not a valid regulation of land use but "an 
out-and-out plan of extortion." 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. Citation to cases 
omitted. 
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or bold, or constitutionally insensitive, to 
advance the illogical and hypertechnical 
argument the COUNTY has developed subsequent 
to trial, for its own self-serving 
justifications. By the COUNTY'S own 
description, it has painted itself into a 
corner with its self-serving characterization 
of what Dolan is really about. 
In the "headnote" (title) to Point I of its 
arguments contained in its REPLY BRIEF, the COUNTY 
asserts there was "no unconstitutional taking", 
ostensibly because the "rough proportionality" test of 
Dolan does not apply. The COUNTY thus misreads the 
Dolan decision. First, the "rough proportionality" test 
of Dolan is separate and apart from the "individualized 
determination" test: the elements are separate and 
distinct, and although both might be required, they are 
not interchangeable with each other. Secondly, much of 
the COUNTY'S argument incorrectly focuses upon the 
"individualized determination" aspect of the test, as 
though the two concepts were interchangeable, which 
they aren't. So again, the COUNTY misanalyzes what 
Dolan really says. The "constitutional" principle of 
"rough proportionality" is constitutionally applicable 
to all of these "takings" situations, even though in a 
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few limited situations (i.e. pure "impact fee" cases), 
the "individualized determination" provisions may not 
be directly applicable or implicated but only because 
of the rather unique method in which "impact fees" are 
derived and paid. 
The COUNTY'S assertions that Dolan's 
"individualized determination" element is inapplicable 
to the "highway-abutting" situation-at-hand is not 
merely intellectual, but lies at the core of this 
"appeal", for very pragmatic reasons. At trial, and 
before the Court of Appeals, the COUNTY argued that 
NEITHER Nollan nor Dolan was applicable. Thus, the 
COUNTY made no attempt to comply with the "burden of 
proof" requirement of Dolan imposed upon the COUNTY: to 
demonstrate the "rough proportionality". Having 
attempted no showing whatsoever, if as B.A.M. 
asserts Dolan IS APPLICABLE, then the COUNTY loses. 
There is neither any "rational basis" nor 
"legitimate state interest" inherent in avoiding the 
proscriptions of the Just Compensation Clause(s). 
Dolan is not merely about "legislative" or 
"adjudicative" distinctions. Dolan is about 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES---namely, the payment of 
"just compensation" for private property "taken for 
public use". [A careful reading of Dolan will further 
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reveal that the Tigard City's "dedication" 
requirements, in part, were indeed pursuant to a 
"legislative" scheme. Dolan and Nollan were decided on 
the basis of constitutional principle ala, a 
"taking" not on the basis of which governmental body 
initiated the taking. The "Just Compensation Clause" is 
invoked in ANY "taking" context, regardless of whether 
it is "administrative" or "legislative", if there is a 
physical taking as there was in the B.A.M. situation. 
In its REPLY BRIEF, the COUNTY re-characterizes the 
true status of the previous cases it has cited in 
support of its assertions. On page 7 (line 11) of its 
REPLY BRIEF the County utilizes the term "exactions", 
but then further explains that the previously-cited 
cases "generally involve(d) payment of impact fees or 
similar economic assessment". Page 7 of REPLY BRIEF of 
COUNTY. For that reason alone i.e. that the COUNTY-
cited cases were generally "impact fees" cases is 
sufficient to justify B.A.M.'s failure to respond: the 
instant situation is a "actual physical takings" case--
-not an impact fees case and the jurisprudential 
logic applied to "impact fees" cases simply doesn't 
apply. 
The second problem with the COUNTY'S analysis is 
the problem created by its own characterization of the 
10 
situation-at-hand. In seven years of litigation, the 
COUNTY has failed to offer one meaningful justification 
why the COUNTY feels the need to require "highway-
abutting" parcels, upon development thereof, to 
dedicate and improve STATE HIGHWAYS falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Transportation 
[UDOT] . This issue is significant for a number of 
factual and legal reasons: 
1. First, because the COUNTY expressly 
rejected and denied B.A.M.'s pre-litigation 
offer to postpone the dedication and postpone 
the installation of the improvements, unless 
and until UDOT would actually come in and make 
the improvements, at which time UDOT would pay 
"just compensation" for the real estate 
interests so "taken". [BAM's related offers to 
plat and improve the developed "residential 
lots" in a manner which would have allowed BAM 
and/or the individualized lotowner to make the 
"just compensation" claim against UDOT were 
similarly REJECTED by the COUNTY, even BEFORE 
the litigation was first filed.] 
2. If the COUNTY had allowed B.A.M. to 
postpone the dedication and the installation--
-which postponement, as noted, was not 
11 
allowed UDOT would have been clearly subj ect 
to the "takings" analysis under THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THEMSELVES, 
irrespective of the applicability of Nolan-
Dolan framework (i.e. dedication required as 
a pre-condition to obtaining local government 
development approval to build). Furthermore, 
UDOT would have also been subject to the 
provision of state statute, namely, Section 
63-90-1 et seq, Utah Code, which MANDATES that 
state agencies including UDOT not only 
identify those "takings" situation and honor 
the constitutional standards as contained in 
interpretative court decisions, but goes 
further to even state that the "takings" be in 
"rough proportionality" (which the Court will 
recognize as the Dolan standard) as to the 
needs created, and so forth. Obviously, UDOT 
is not in the regular practice of issuing 
"development approval"; such is a function of 
units of local government counties (for 
their unincorporated areas) and 
municipalities. The "bottom line" principle 
nevertheless is that the COUNTY ignored the 
practical effect of the statute and required 
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unconstitutional dedications and improvements, 
which UDOT was constitutionally and/or 
statutorily prohibited from requiring. The 
Utah Legislature, in numerous locations, has 
enacted statutory provisions affirmatively 
recognizing particularly subsequent to the 
1987 Nollan decision the "constitutional 
takings" issues. The 2005 LUDMA, adopted by 
the Legislature, incorporates Dolan-type 
language "rough proportionality" as being the 
standard of measure for "exactions" by county 
government. See Section 37 of Senate Bill 60 
[2005] , page 47-48. The COUNTY seems to be the 
only jurisdiction which "somehow hasn't quite 
yet got it".[Even though UDOT was, arguably, 
the intended beneficiary of the excessive, 
unconstitutional "takings", the COUNTY, which 
intentionally effected such "takings", should 
provide the "just compensation" therefor.] 
The COUNTY further mischaracterizes and mis-casts 
the nature of the B.A.M. claims, and then purports to 
come to a conclusion explaining away those claims. [The 
Court will be well-aware of this rhetorical device.] 
The COUNTY asserts [page 1 of its REPLY BRIEF] that 
B.A.M. is not so much concerned with the "quantity" of 
13 
the COUNTY'S purported taking, as opposed to its 
"quality". The COUNTY'S statement is thus: 
A key problem with BAM's analysis is its 
emphasis on the quantity of the County's 
purported taking, as opposed to its quality. 
Stated otherwise, BAM is preoccupied with 
degree rather than kind. Yet it is the kind, 
or quality, of the highway right-of-way 
dedication not the degree to which it 
impacted BAM that distinguishes this case 
from others. 
REPLY BRIEF of the COUNTY, page 1. Emphasis in original 
text. The COUNTY misapprehends and misconstrues 
B.A.M.'s position on both issues: B.A.M. is concerned 
with BOTH the "quantity" (i.e. in terms of the 
"excessive" nature of the required "dedications and 
improvements installations"), as well as the "quality" 
(i.e. that the dedications and improvements arise from 
the claimed "uniform", unyielding Ordinance 
provisions). It makes little difference or distinction 
to B.A.M. the particular basis as to how its property 
is unconstitutionally "taken". An uncompensated 
"taking" unconstitutional, regardless of method is 
still a "taking". 
B.A.M.'s position always was and continues to be 
that the CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES embodied within the 
national and state constitutions are controlling and 
the self-serving distinction of "administrative" (or 
"adjudicative") as contrasted with "legislative" has NO 
14 
CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE. 
B.A.M. is detrimentally impacted either way, 
regardless of the basis the COUNTY asserts as a 
justification for the "taking": indeed, before the 
District Court, the COUNTY had asserted that NEITHER 
Nollan nor Dolan applied to the case-at-hand. That same 
argument (non-applicability of Nollan and Dolan) was 
advanced by the COUNTY in its arguments before the 
Court of Appeals. In its familiar flip-flop fashion, 
the COUNTY now concedes that Nolan IS APPLICABLE (but 
has been satisfied), but that Dolan is inapplicable. 
[B.A.M. believes and asserts that Nollan and Dolan are 
absolutely intertwined, and that the United States 
Supreme Court intended (with Dolan) that Dolan be read 
TOGETHER WITH Nollan (and as a supplement to Nollan! 
The COUNTY conveniently ignores the holdings and 
statements of the United States Supreme Court involving 
"physical occupations and actual takings" (as 
contrasted with "regulatory takings"). For example, in 
Loretto vs Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, 4 58 
US 419, 73 LEd2d 868, 102 SCt 3164 (1982), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the statutorily-required 
installation of a cable-television circuit junction 
box, of only a couple cubic feet in size, upon 
privately-held property (wall of apartment house), 
15 
constituted a "taking" for constitutional purposes. If 
"cable television junction box" affixed to wall of an 
apartment house is a "taking", then certainly the 
coerced dedication of thousands and thousands of square 
feet of real estate and the tens of thousands of 
dollars of "excessive" improvements constitutes for 
constitutional purposes a "taking". Later-announced 
cases consistently support the Loretto holding. See 
Palazzolo vs Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 150 LEd2d 592, 
121 SCt 2448 (2001), as discussed in B.A.M.'s OPENING 
BRIEF. 
II 
ISSUE #2: ADMINISTRATIVE REMAND 
Notwithstanding the COUNTY'S affirmative 
acknowledgement [as contained in its POINT #3 
ARGUMENTS that Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, carves 
out an "exception" to the "administrative hearing" 
requirements], the COUNTY argues for almost two pages 
(out of its 15-page REPLY BRIEF) that the 
"administrative remand" portions of the Court of 
Appeals decision are correct and make sense, but that 
such provisions (of the Court of Appeals Decision) are 
implicitly incorrect. However, in the end, the COUNTY 
without unconditionally saying as much, implicitly 
concedes the "administrative remand" portion of the 
16 
Decision was incorrect. 
The Court of Appeals decision was, on the 
"administrative remand" issue, wrong and incorrect 
for the simple reason that it failed to apprehend the 
provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code. Such a 
situation arose because the issue wasn't raised as an 
issue in the pleadings, wasn't raised on appeal, and 
until the Court of Appeals actually issued its ruling, 
wasn't before the parties (or the Court of Appeals, for 
that matter). The COUNTY having conceded as much, it 
makes little sense for the Supreme Court to spend any 
time on Issue #2 [the administrative remand issue]. 
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court is nevertheless 
affirmatively requested to EXPRESSLY state and overrule 
those portions of the Court of Appeals decision 
pertaining to the "administrative remand" namely, 
Paragraphs 6 through 10, inclusively, of the Decision, 
if only for the following reasons: 
1. To do justice and to clearly establish 
"law of the case" principles, on the basis 
that the District Court's judgment in favor of 
the COUNTY is overturned and the case remanded 
back to the District Court for judgment to be 
entered in favor of B.A.M. on the basis of the 
Nollan-Dolan criteria. 
17 
2. To set the status of "the law of Utah" 
with respect to "inverse condemnation" cases 
as not being "on-the-record" at the District 
Court stage. If such correction is not 
expressly undertaken by the Supreme Court, 
practitioners and judges arguably will have a 
mistaken view of "the law" with respect to how 
"inverse condemnation" cases are actually to 
be tried. 
In somewhat similar vein, the "administrative 
remand" analysis and discussion is arguably rendered 
"moot" by the subsequent adoption by the 2005 
Legislature of Senate Bill No. 60, adopting the Utah 
Land Use Development and Management Act [abbreviated 
"LUDMA"] , a 192-page legislation which incorporated new 
statutory provisions which supersede the previous 
statutory provisions, upon which the Court of Appeals 
Decision was based. [The "SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS" 
document filed by B.A.M. as to the effect of LUDMA has 
been separately filed, essentially simultaneous with 
the filing of this REPLY BRIEF.] The Court should 
nevertheless be cognizant of the fact that although 
LUDMA made sweeping and comprehensive changes in how 
"land-use" decisions are made and are litigated, there 
were no changes to how "inverse condemnation" cases are 
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to be filed and litigated. Thus, the provisions of 
Section 63-90a-4 are STILL CONTROLLING, as the COUNTY 
now seemingly concedes, but still doesn't quite want to 
admit it clearly. 
Thus, for the party-litigants in this case in 
specific, it makes no sense for the Court to engage in 
lengthy discussion or analysis of the "administrative 
remand" issues which the COUNTY implicitly admits was 
incorrectly decided, notwithstanding the COUNTY'S 
continuing inability to affirmatively state as much in 
clear terms. It makes absolutely no sense to "remand" 
the case back to the District Court for remand to the 
County "administrative hearing officer", now that the 
County concedes the issue. 
For the foregoing reasons (the inherent wrongness 
of the Court of Appeals Decision on the "administrative 
remand" issue, as well as the 2005 legislative adoption 
of LUDMA), any Supreme Court discussion of the former 
provisions of the state statutes would be, in the 
opinion of the undersigned, meaningless (i.e. there no 
longer exists any "case and controversy" on this narrow 
issue): any guidance for practitioners and subordinate 
courts, FOR FUTURE CASES, is unnecessary but for the 
"correcting" nature of the Supreme Court's analysis, as 
deemed appropriate. 
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B 
"AMICUS"-IDENTIFIED ISSUES 
RELATED TO THE "ADMINISTRATIVE REMAND" 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT gratefully acknowledges the 
insightful efforts undertaken by the Utah Private 
Property Ombudsman, as "amicus" in this case: 
particularly those efforts which have identified and 
supported the Nollan-Dolan framework as being THE 
analytical standard to be applied herein. However, 
given the COUNTY'S ostensible "concession" that the 
"administrative remand" issue [certified "Issue #2] was 
improperly decided, except for the necessity of the 
Supreme Court "correcting" (for this case alone) the 
Court of Appeals Decision, there is no necessity for 
the Court to delve into some of the other issues the 
"amicus" has identified. 
Ill 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63-90a-4 
ARE CONTROLLING AND DISPOSITIVE 
A 
THE COUNTY CONCEDES THE APPLICABILITY 
AND DISPOSITIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 63-90a-4 
The COUNTY now concedes that the provisions of 
Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, in the context of "inverse 
condemnation" actions asserting "unconstitutional 
takings claims" are applicable and controlling to the 
case-at-hand. Thus, no additional argument is 
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necessary. 
Except for the Court to briefly but nevertheless 
expressly note the reasons why the Supreme Court 
might want to identify why the Decision itself was 
incorrectly decided by the Court of Appeals, exhaustive 
discussion of the issue is neither warranted nor 
expected. 
B 
THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 63-90a-4 
WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Although the COUNTY concedes NOW the applicability 
of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, the COUNTY further 
argues i.e. "objects" that B.A.M. should not be 
allowed to raise Section 63-90a-4 as a dispositive 
issue. The COUNTY asserts that B.A.M. failed to present 
the applicability of Section 63-90a-4 to the Court of 
Appeals, and takes issue with B.A.M.'s statement that 
the issue was presented to the Court of Appeals in its 
"petition for rehearing". Because on this point the 
issue (and point to be made thereon) is so absolutely 
critical (i.e. candor before a tribunal), BAM quotes 
extensively from the COUNTY'S "REPLY BRIEF", thus: 
BAM correctly argues that the Court of 
Appeals' decision "overlooked" the application 
of Sec. 63-90a-4 to this case. It is true that 
the Court of Appeals did not discuss the 
application of Section 63-90a-4. However, this 
is because BAM never raised this issue in the 
Court of Appeals. Thus, the County objects to 
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Supreme Court consideration of this issue on 
the grounds that the issue was Sec. 63-90a-4 
was not properly preserved below. BAM argues 
that application of Sec. 63-90a-4 arose from 
the Court of Appeals' decision which developed 
the "administrative hearing and record" issue 
sua sponte, not at the suggestion of either 
party. However, BAM then erroneously states 
that 
" [e]ven when the obvious 
applicability of Section 63-90a-4 
was brought to the Court of Appeals' 
attention (in the context of the 
'petition for rehearing'), the Court 
of Appeals ultimately declined to 
consider the same." 
BAM Op. Brief at 46. Thus, BAM implies that it 
raised Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for 
Rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals on 
March 5, 2004. In actuality, BAM never 
mentioned Sec. 63-90a-4 in its Petition for 
Rehearing. In twenty-three pages of argument 
for rehearing, BAM exhaustively reargued its 
case, but nowhere did it invoke the provisions 
of Sec. 63-90a-4. Thus, BAM should be 
precluded from raising the issue of Sec. 63-
90a-4 first (sic) the first time in this 
Court. 
However, if the Supreme Court chooses to 
consider this issue on its merits 
notwithstanding the lack of preservation 
below, it appears that Sec. 63-90a-4 applies 
to this case. . . . 
COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF, pages 11-12. Emphasis added. 
Footnote citation omitted. 
The original 23-page "Petition for Rehearing" was 
devoid of any reference to Section 63-90a-4. However, 
that originally-filed "petition for rehearing" was 
replaced and "substituted" and the COUNTY knows that; 
the COUNTY affirmatively responded to the "substituted" 
petition! The COUNTY has thus before the Supreme 
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Court engaged in a "play on words", which although 
technically accurate nevertheless intentionally 
presents a distorted procedural picture, particularly 
in its "legal" conclusion to be drawn therefrom (i.e. 
the Supreme Court should not consider the issue). The 
COUNTY'S assertions (that 63-90a-4 was NOT presented to 
the Court of Appeals in the "petition for rehearing" 
context) are simply but absolutely false and 
constitute an intentional misrepresentation and 
distortion of the truth. 
B.A.M.'s original "Petition for Rehearing" was 
filed with the Court of Appeals on or about 5 March 
2004; the "brief" (petition) was 23 pages long and was 
"non-conforming" (due to the excessive page length 
limitation of 15 pages) . On or about 18 March 2004 
B.A.M.'s undersigned counsel applied for "leave of 
court" to file a "substitute" petition for rehearing, 
specifically to include Section 63-90a-4. [A photocopy 
of the B.A.M. motion is included herein at APPENDIX 
#1.] The Court of Appeals, in response to the B.A.M. 
motion, issued an Order (on or about 22 March 2004), 
authorizing the "substitute" petition for rehearing. 
[APPENDIX #2]. B.A.M. filed the "substitute" petition 
for rehearing. [See APPENDIX #3, which contains 
relevant excerpts of the filed petition, pertaining to 
2^ 
63-90a-4]. The COUNTY thereafter (1 April 2004) filed 
its responsive "brief", entitled "APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM 
IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S SUBSTITUTED PETITION FOR 
REHEARING". Emphasis added. [See APPENDIX #4, 
containing excerpts from the COUNTY'S "brief".] The 
COUNTY argued that "Section 63-90a-4 has no relevance 
to this Case" [page 3 of COUNTY'S "brief"; page 5 of 
APPENDIX #4] and thereafter took the better part of 
five and one-half pages (pages 3 through 8 of the 
COUNTY'S "brief") to assert that point. 
Obviously, B.A.M. did in fact and in law raise 
the applicability of Section 63-90a-4. The COUNTY 
affirmatively responded thereto before the Court of 
Appeals. To imply no, to affirmatively state, as the 
COUNTY has done otherwise, through the oblique 
reference to the "23-page (original) petition for 
rehearing" as though that brief were THE operative 
"petition" upon which the Court of Appeals acted is 
intentionally misleading towards this superior 
tribunal, the Utah Supreme Court. In the opinion of the 
undersigned, the COUNTY owes the Court a serious 
explanation of this seemingly intentional 
misrepresentation. 
CONCLUSION 
The "constitutional" principles announced and 
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applied in Nollan and in Dolan are clear, concise and 
unambiguous. The factual and "legal" setting behind 
Nollan and Dolan are essentially "verbatim" to the 
situation-at-hand. Those "constitutional" principles— 
that a "taking" occurs by the coerced dedication and 
improvement of real estate, as conditioned upon 
development approval are unchangeable, regardless of 
the "legislative" or "administrative" distinctions the 
COUNTY self-servingly argues for. The constitutions do 
not make such a distinction; neither should this Court. 
The COUNTY concedes albeit not quite 
unconditionally so that the "administrative remand" 
issue [certified Issue #2] was incorrectly decided by 
the Court of Appeals. Except for such dispositive 
analysis and/or holding as the Supreme Court deems 
necessary to "fix" the problem (for "law of the case" 
reasons), elaborate discussion is unnecessary. 
The case should be remanded to the District Court 
to enter judgment in favor of B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, 
consistent with the Nollan-Dolan standards. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 
2005. . , y 
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0RIG1KAL 
STEPHEN G HOMER (153 6) 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone (801) 561-9665 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 1 8 20M 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
B.A.M, DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
body politic and political 
subdivision of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant 
APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR LEAVE OF • COURT 
TO FILE "SUBSTITUTED" 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 20010840-CA 
The Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.M/ DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
hereby respectfully moves the Court 'for leave to file a 
"substituted" PETITION FOR REHEARING, to incorporate as 
a basis for "rehearing" the provisions of Section 63-90a-
4, Utah Code, which provides in relevant part: 
(b) The private property owner need not file 
the appeal authorized by this section before 
bringing an action in any court to adjudicate 
claims that are eligible for appeal, 
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the 
action of a political subdivision does not 
constitute, and may not be interpreted as 
constituting, a failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing 
legal action. 
Emphasis added. 
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The applicability of the foregoing statutory 
provisions seemingly unconsidered within the Decision 
as originally published by the Court and the 
apparently-dispositive nature of such provisions in the 
context of the Court's announced decision, was recently 
(yesterday) brought to the undersigned's attention by 
fellow practicing attorneys who became aware of the now-
publicized "decision", now subject to widespread 
dissemination (Utah Advance Reports and/or Internet-
availability) following closure of the initial "petition 
for rehearing" period wherein the original Petition was 
timely filed. 
Consideration of the new issue so raised in the 
"substitute" Petition is meritorious on the grounds of 
advising the Court of Appeals of a significant, perhaps 
dispositive legal issue the original Decision seemingly 
overlooked, to avoid additional undue delay and expense, 
and/or to avoid the filing of a petition for certiorari 
to the Utah Supreme Court to correct the apparent error 
within that Decision. 
The proposed "substitute" Petition to incorporate 
the Section 63-9Qa-4 issue and arguments has been 
prepared and is attached hereto. The proposed 
"substitute" Petition has been modified to conform to the 
page-limitations imposed by the Appellate Rules. 
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APPENDIX #2 
Court of Appeals' ORDER approving 
"SUBSTITUTE" PETITION FOR REHEARING 
[22 March 2004] 
•tta* 
Itf THE UTAff COORT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
B.A.M. Development, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Salt Lake County, a Utah body 
Politic and political 
subdivision 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20010840-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion, 
filed March 18, 2004 for leave to file
 a substituted petition for 
rehearing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's motion is granted. 
Appellant's substituted petition for rehearing filed on March 18, 
2004 is accepted by the court. 
Pursuant to Rule 35(a), of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellee is requested to file a response to 
Appellant's Substituted Petition for Rehearing filed by the 
Appellant. Appellee's response should comply with the 
Requirements of Rule 35, and be filed within 14 days from the 
3ate of this order. 
Dated this %2 day of March, 2004, 
FOR THE COURT: 
/§^W^ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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company, 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah 
body politic and political 
subdivision of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant 
APPELLANT'S. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
[SUBSTITUTED] 
Case No. 20010840-CA 
The Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.'M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.CW* 
submits the following SUBSTITUTED APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING. 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
The undersigned counsel certifies that this Petition 
for Rehearing is filed .in good faith and not for purposes 
of delay. On 8 March 2004 the Appellant originally filed' 
the Petition for Rehearing which has not been decided. 
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The Court of Appeals decision, filed 20 February 2004 
[hereinafter referred to as "the Decision"] , is in error 
and should be withdrawn, re-worked and revised to address 
and reflect the following issues and considerations. 
2 
APPENDIX #3 
THE DECISION SEEMINGLY OVERLOOKS THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 63-90a-4, UTAH CODE 
The Decision disposing of the appeal on the basis 
of the "lack of administrative record" issue, which issue 
was not raised by the pleadinqs, tried in the District 
Court nor briefed and araued on aooeal seeminalv 
overlooks the provisions of Section 63-90a-4, Utah Code, 
wnich provides in relevant part: 
(2) (a) (i) Any owner of private property whose 
interest is subject to a physical takirigUor 
exaction by a political subdivision may appeal 
the political subdivision's decision within 30 
days after the decision is made. 
(ii) The legislative body of the 
political subdivision, or an 
individual or body designated by them, 
shall hear and approve or reject the 
appeal within 14 days after it is 
submitted, 
(iii) If the legislative body of the 
political subdivision fails to hear 
and decide the appeal within 14 days, 
the decision is presumed to be 
approved 
(b) The private property owner need not file 
the appeal authorized by this section before 
bringing an action in any court to adjudicate 
claims that are eligible for appeal, 
(c) A property owner's failure to appeal the 
action of a political subdivision does not 
constitute. and may not be interpreted as 
constituting/ a failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing 
legal action. 
Emphasis added. 
Although the Court is the ultimate arbiter as to the 
interplay between apparently-conflicting statutes, the 
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63-90a-4 provisions—not even cited in the Decision— 
would seem to have dispositive significance to the "lack 
of administrative record" issue. 
If, for an "inverse condemnation" action such as 
this, the property owner [Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT] is not required—per Subsection 63-90a-
4(b)—to file an appeal, then the lack of any 
"administrative record" cannot be a jurisdictional pre-
condition to the filing and maintenance Of the action.* 
Furthermore, the express provisions of Subsection 
63-90a-4 (c)^  would seemingly OVERRIDE muchr--if not all 
of the Court's discussion of the "lack of administrative 
record" and "exhaustion" issues within the Decision. 
On this latter point, the "specific1' statutory 
provisions of 63-90a-4 being facially "directly on point" 
with the "inverse condemnation" claims-at-hand would seem 
to be controlling over the more "qeneral" statutory 
provisions of 17-27-1001 the Decision has construed to be 
dispositive. See Millett vs Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 
P.2d 934 (Utah Supreme Court 1980) ["[W]here the 
operation of two statutory provisions is in conflict, 
that provision which is more specific in its application 
will govern over that which is more general." 609 P. 2d at 
xThe Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT did timely "appeal" 
the County Commission, which refused to consider the "appea 
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Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
B.A.M.iDEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Appellee/Defendant 
APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S 
SUBSTITUTED PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Court of Appeals No. 20010840-CA 
Trial Court Civil No. 980908157 CD 
The Appellee/Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY ["County"] by and through its 
undersigned counsel of record, Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney for the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney's Office, hereby submits its Memorandum in Response to 
Appellant's Substituted Petition for Rehearing, filed March 18,2004 by Appellant/Plaintiff 
B.A.M. Development, LLC ["BAM"]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rehearing in this Court limited to instances where the petitioner demonstrates "points 
of law or fact which ... the court has overlooked or misapprehended." URAP, Rule 35(a). 
As discussed below, BAM has not demonstrated that the this Court overlooked or 
misapprehended any relevant law or fact; it simply disagrees with the majority decision. 
Thus, its petition for rehearing is not well taken. 
1. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 63-90a-4 Has No Relevance to this Case 
BAM argues that the Court has apparently "overlooked" Utah Code Ann., Sec. 63-
90a-1., et. seq. in its Decision. BAM states that its counsel recently became aware of the 
"apparently dispositive nature" of Section 63-90a-4 when the statute was "brought to 
[BAM's attorney's] attention by fellow practicing attorneys...." See, BAM's Motion for 
Leave of Court to file "Substituted" Petition for Rehearing, p. 2. In its "substituted" petition 
for rehearing ["Aplnt's Petition"], BAM places great weight on the statute as having 
"controlling status" over Sec. 17-27-1001. Petition, pp. 3 - 5. The Court of Appeals relied 
upon the latter section for its holding that district court review of the County's land use 
decision in this case {i.e., approving BAM's subdivision plan subject to a required dedication 
of land for highway right-of-way) is limited to review of a record generated at the county 
administrative level. The necessary concomitant of this holding is that under Sec. 17-27-
1001(3)(a), the County should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on BAM's appeal of 
the dedication requirement, and created a record for review by the district court. See, B.AM. 
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Development, LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2004 WL 316141 (Utah App.) ("Decision"), ffi[ 9 -
15,17. BAM now argues that Sec. 63-90a-4(b) "overrides" the hearing and recordmaking 
requirements which this court read into Sec. 17-27-1001. Aplnt's Motion, at 4. 
BAM misapprehends the purpose and function of Sec. 63-90a-4(b). That statues does 
not relate to an administrative appeal of adverse land use decision of a county's planning 
commission or board of adjustment. Rather, it relates solely to the availability of, and 
procedure for seeking, administrative relief in claims of constitutional takings. Sec. 63-90a-4 
is part of a statute, enacted in 1994, entitled "Constitutional Takings Issues." Significantly, 
in its present motion, BAM omits any reference to subsection (1) of Sec. 63-90a-4, which 
provides: 
(1) "Each political subdivision1 shall enact an ordinance that: 
(a) establishes a procedure for review of actions that may have 
constitutional taking issues and 
(b) meets the requirements of this section." 
BAM reads subsection(2)(b), which provides that "[t]he private property owner need 
not file the appeal authorized by this section before bringing an action in court to adjudicate 
claims that are eligible for appeal," in complete isolation, without regard to the limited 
underlying purpose and scope of the statute. By focusing solely on the foregoing provision, 
BAM ignores the function and intent of the Constitutional Taking Issues statute. It is 
axiomatic that "the plain language of a statute is to read as a whole and it provisions 
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute ...." See, e.g., Thomas v. 
u<Political subdivisions" include counties. Sec. 63-90a-l(2). 
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Color County Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added; internal 
citations omitted). Here, BAM fails to so read Sec. 63-90a-4. 
The statute was designed to provide a framework for speedy and inexpensive 
administrative consideration of takings claims asserted by private property owners at the 
local political subdivision level. In accordance with the statute's mandate that political 
subdivisions "shall enact an ordinance2," Salt Lake County adopted its "takings relief 
ordinance3 ["the Ordinance"] in 1999. In its preliminary findings, the Ordinance notes as 
follows: 
"In the event an owner of private property within the unincorporated area of 
the county claims that the application or enforcement of county zoning 
ordinances or other land use regulation constitutes an unconslitutional taking 
of its private property, it is in the best interest of the county to have established 
procedures for obtaining relevant information for analyzing such claim and 
determining whether it might be appropriate to grant certain relief to the 
claimant, rather than conducting such analysis in a more confrontational, 
expensive and time-consuming litigation context." 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 19.93.020 B (emphasis added). The Ordinance 
then establishes a comprehensive procedure whereby a property owner may (but is not 
required to) file a petition for relief. Id., Sec. 19.93,030. After preliminary administrative 
review, the procedures under the Ordinance include the appointment of an independent 
heanng officer to conduct a public hearing and make recommendations to the county 
2Sec. 63-90a-4(l). 
3Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 19.93.010, et. seq. ("Procedures for 
Analyzing Takings Claims"). (Copy attached hereto as Exhibit "A") 
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administrative remedies." Accordingly, then, while an aggrieved property owner must 
exhaust administrative remedies with respect to a county's land use decision (contrary to 
BAM's unsupported assertion8, a "land use decision" includes conditions and restrictions 
which a county may attach to a subdivision approval9) in order to obtain a "final land use 
decision" from which appeal may be taken to district court10, that does not mean that an 
administrative petition for "takings relief1 under a county's ordinance is a prerequisite to 
judicial review. Simply put, the former procedure is mandatory; the latter is optional. 
In its present petition, BAM confuses the two avenues of administrative review. Thus, 
there is no "conflict" between the two statutes, and Sec. 63-90a-4 does not "override" Sec. 
17-27-1001, as BAM argues. Rather, the former supplements the latter by providing an 
additional - but not required - vehicle for seeking relief from an alleged taking of private 
property. This view harmonizes Sec. 17-27-1001 with Sec. 63-90a-4(c) which provides that 
"[a] property owner's failure to appeal the action of a political subdivision 
%See, Aplnt's Petition, pp. 5-11. 
9Sec. 17-27-100 l(2)(a) provides that "[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision 
made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court...." (Emphasis added). The foregoing phrase 
"provisions of this chapter" includes the provisions of Sec. 17-27-801, et seq., which governs 
subdivision approvals. Hence, a county's conditional approval of a developer's subdivision plat 
is clearly a "land use decision" within the ambit of the appeals provisions of Sec. 17-27-1001. 
l0It is fundamental doctrine of takings jurisprudence that before judicial review of a local 
land use decision will be entertained, there must be a "final decision" of the local land use 
authority. That is, before a takings claim may be addressed by a court,"... the government 
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reach a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). 
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governing body (i.e., the County Council). Id., Sec. 19.93.040 B. The Council then is 
required to review the hearing officer's recommendations and approve or deny the claimant's 
petition, and may hold a further public hearing to receive any new evidence. Id., Sec. 
19.93.040 J. 
The state statute, and the corollary county ordinance, simply create an optional 
procedure by which a property owner may administratively assert a takings claim. The 
procedure, however, is strictly at the option of the private property owner. This is the 
rationale underlying the provision of the statute - which is the sole focus of BAM's present 
motion - that "[t]he private property owner need not file the appeal authorized by this 
section before bringing an action in any court.... " 
The problem with BAM's view of Sec. 63-90a-4 is that BAM treats that statute as 
"conflicting"5 with and "controlling"6 over Sec. 17-27-1001 when, in reality, the two 
provisions are entirely separate and distinct in their function and purpose. The provisions 
of Sec. 17-27-1001 require an administrative appeal procedure for persons adversely affected 
by county land use decisions7. Sec. 17-27-1001(1) provides that "[n]o person may challenge 
in district court a county's land use decision ... until that person has exhausted all 
4Sec. 63-90a-4(b). 
*Aplnt's Petition, p. 4. 
6/tf.,p.5. 
7
 For example, in Salt Lake County, the administrative appeal of an adverse decision of 
the planning commission respecting a subdivision application is heard by the county council. 
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 18.08.050. 
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does not constitute, an may not interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust 
available administrative remedies or a bar to bringing legal action." 
In short, BAM's argument, founded upon its narrow, isolated reading of Sec. 63-90a-
4(2)(b), is not even related to - much less "dispositive" of- the administrative hearing and 
recordmaking requirements enunciated by the Court of Appeals' decision. BAM seemingly 
is comparing proverbial apples an oranges in an effort to find a "conflicting" and 
"controlling" statute under which the court might reevaluate its decision. Accordingly, 
BAM's present motion should be denied. 
2. BAM's Action is an Appeal of a Land Use Decision 
BAM next argues that its district court action was not, and should not be treated as, 
an appeal of a county land use decision subject to the provisions of Sec. 17-27-1001. Aplnt's 
Petition, pp. 5-9. BAM attempts to distinguish its action as one for inverse condemnation, 
and not a land use appeal. 
Simply put, it is both. While BAM's theory of recovery is that county action resulted 
in an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation, the County 
action giving rise to this claim is its final land use decision which conditioned BAM's 
subdivision approval on the dedication of land for highway right-of-way. BAM itself appears 
to have recognized Sec. 17-27-1001 as governing its appeal, inasmuch as it filed its action 
in district court within the required thirty (30) day period allowed for appeal after the 
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whereas Sec. 17-27-1001 provides the exclusive procedure for seeking district court review 
of a county land use decision. 
BAM has not shown any error in the majority's reasoning or authority, and no 
"overlooked or misapprehended" law or fact. BAM simply doesn't like the majority opinion, 
and wants the Court to reverse itself. The Decision reasonably construes Sec. 17-27-1001 and 
its analysis represents a sensible, rational scheme for administrative hearing and 
recordmaking, followed by limited district court review. 
Accordingly, BAM has not satisfied the standards for rehearing set forth at URAP Rule 
35(a), and its present petition should be denied. 
Dated this March 30,2004. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DOTOANSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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